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Abstract  
 
An establishment of long-term partnerships with travel agencies is an important way of geographical expansion of 
large tour operators. Such a relationship is a strategic alternative for tour operators’ interaction with independent 
travel agents through market transactions. We have investigated the influence of certain characteristics of Russian 
tour operators working in the field of outbound tourism on their ability to develop a partnership model of 
geographical expansion. The results show that tour operators with a high brand reputation, having a high index of 
geographical concentration of its agent network are more likely to create partnerships with travel agencies, rather 
than other tour operators. 
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Introduction 
 
A wide variety of companies associated with each set of horizontal and vertical relations operate within the tourism 
system of almost every country (Tremblay, 1998). These relations include the relationship between tour operators 
and travel agencies, which may be based on the principles of the common market transactions or a partnership. 
Agency contracts, commission agreements, the paid services or contracts for the sale of tourism product are used in 
Russia within a market form of interaction between the tour operator and travel agencies that function as mediators 
to sale tours. The partnership between them is usually formed in terms of licensing or franchising. 
The degree of tour operators’ focus on partnerships with travel agents depends primarily on the strategy of market 
expansion chosen by each of them. If the tour operator is focused on creating its own network of travel agencies, it 
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will not be much interested in the conclusion of partnership agreements with travel agencies, or will use such 
contracts as an intermediate step in the formation of a wholly owned agency network. Otherwise, the tour operator 
will actively develop collaborative relationships with travel agencies, which can be described as vertical 
partnerships. On the other hand, the selection of cooperative strategy by the tour operator is largely determined by 
the degree of its attractiveness as a partner for travel agencies. 
Studying the experience of a large number of tour operators in the field of international outbound tourism in Russia 
shows that they use means for partnership in their relationships with travel agencies in varying degrees. This fact 
raises the question: what characteristics of the tour operator affect its propensity for partnerships with travel 
agencies? 
Several theoretical approaches and empirical researches have been studied, not only in tourism but also in other 
similar industries that are experiencing similar issues in order to find an answer to this question. The author has tried 
to find out to what extent the laws of the partnership arrangements inherent to the developed countries, are capable 
for the Russian tourist market by means of the verification of the proposed hypotheses.  
 
Hypotheses 
 
Basing on the study of works of foreign researchers on similar or related topics this article identifies three key 
characteristics of tour operators, which are collectively expected to have an impact on the characteristics of their 
interaction with the travel agencies: (1) the brand name reputation, (2) the size of the tour operator and (3) the 
degree of geographical concentration of its agent network. 
The influence of the brand reputation on the formation of a tour operator’s partnership strategy can be described in 
two ways. On the one hand, you can assume that those firms that still do not have a strong brand and are not widely 
recognized are more interested in forming an extensive network of travel agencies under their own trademarks using 
such partnership agreements, as the licensing contract and franchise agreement in order to build the strong 
brand. Such pattern was previously identified particularly for restaurant chains. A central company in a restaurant 
chain is usually trying to create its reputation by providing multiple branches in regions. This strategy tends to be 
successful, because branches can be arranged more quickly in case of using a network of cooperative partners, and 
accordingly, the process of creating a brand comes faster. A similar picture can easily be projected on the "tour 
operator - travel agencies" relationship – especially when we are talking about two business forms which have very 
similar features referring to the common tourism industry. 
This circumstance can be the reason for the abundance of offerings for travel agencies to conclude partnership 
agreements, often in the form of franchising, from the little-known Russian tour operators. The tendency of little-
known companies to gain the status of the franchisor can serve as evidence that owners of strong brands often do not 
show the bigger commitment to partnership with travel agencies, unlike a company with just enough recognizable 
brand name which uses franchising in order to speed up the establishment of its brand. 
At the same time, tour operators with a low rating of recognition do not always find an adequate response from the 
travel agencies, which see a significant risk to their operations in closer long-term relationships with such tour 
operators. The influence of the brand reputation on the cooperative behavior of the tour operator can be recognized 
mostly through its ability to motivate agencies to become and remain partners. The attractiveness of the business 
image of the central company for affiliate organizations occurs largely due to a good brand perception of the 
prospect and current customers. With regard to the tourism area, this means that the good reputation of the brand 
causes a greater flow of tourists through the associated travel agencies, which, in its turn, ensures a higher demand 
for their services and, therefore, higher revenues and profits. Other authors have already noted this consistent pattern 
in the restaurant business. It can be seen in tourism area, too: customers often make one-time purchase first focusing 
on the brand reputation (Luxenberg, 1985; Shook and Shook, 1993). The success of the restaurant 
here depends a lot on whether it can persuade test or first-time users to repeat their visit. Special role of the brand's 
reputation for the formation of customer loyalty is observed in the studies on tourism. Tour packages from known 
tour operators represent the high quality and reliability of services, which in the long run can create "reputational" 
effects and help to "attract" a wide range of clients for travel agencies (Succurro, 2006). 
In general, we assume that a factor of brand appeal to the target touristic audience has a relatively stronger influence 
on the feasibility of the affiliate strategy of tour operators in their relationships with travel agencies. Hence the 
hypothesis is stated: 
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Hypothesis 1. Tour operator’s brand reputation and its propensity for partnerships with travel agencies are 
positively related. 
 Active usage of means for partnership is often explained through the concept of resource constraints. In particular, 
this applies to such form of inter-firm partnerships, as franchising (Oxenfeldt & Kelly, 1968; Lafontaine & 
Kaufmann, 1994; Combs & Ketchen, 1999). From the point of view of resource constraints, the firm uses a 
franchise in the case of the lack of financial, human and / or information resources for market coverage (Dant & 
Kaufmann, 2003). It is believed that the status of the franchisor in inter-firm partnerships with smaller companies 
tends to lack capital for rapid market expansion (Martin, 1988). 
The above-mentioned studies were carried out in the context of "franchising versus ownership". According to their 
logic, it turns out that in the case of limited resources the central company is forced to resort to the mechanism of 
franchising in order to achieve the rapid expansion of the market, although at a different situation for the same 
purpose it would be preferable for them to create their own subsidiaries or affiliates. Assuming that the number of 
independent firms with which the central company interacts on the principles of simple market transactions is a 
constant value, then any preference of ownership to franchising (that is a usual characteristic of large companies 
with the resources) automatically reduces the propensity to create partnership, defined as the ratio of the number of 
affiliate firms to the number of all market agents. Hence the second hypothesis can be stated as: 
Hypothesis 2. The size of the company (tour operator) and its propensity for partnerships with travel agencies are 
negatively related. 
The third characteristic of the tour operator - the degree of concentration of its agency chain - is the reciprocal value 
to the geographical dispersion of activity. According to the previously conducted research, the geographic dispersion 
affects the organizational costs in many service industries, where actions should be as close as possible to consumers 
(Carman and Langeard, 1980). Although associated travel agencies which are geographically distant from the tour 
operator’s headquarters contribute the most complete coverage of the market, control over their activities and 
motivation at the same time requires a fairly high cost, which may adversely affect the financial and economic 
performance of the company (the tour operator). Accordingly, in the case of the agency chain geographically 
concentrated in a relatively small number of regions, the tour operator interaction with the travel agencies for the 
partnership scheme is associated with lower costs, including those of them that are related to the possible 
opportunistic behavior of partners. Basing on the above we can formulate the hypothesis 3. 
Hypothesis 3. The geographical concentration of the tour operator’s agent network and its propensity for 
partnerships with travel agencies are positively related. 
 
Methods and Data 
 
A multiple regression model was selected to test the three hypotheses.  We defined the parameter «Degree 
of Partnership» (DP) as the dependent variable. It is measured by the percentage of partner travel agencies (PTA) 
from the total number of affiliated and independent travel agencies (ITA) within the agent network of a tour 
operator: 
  
)( ITAPTA
PTADP                   (1) 
 
The following independent variables were chosen: 
Brand name reputation. This variable is measured by means of the survey of experts on a ten-point scale. The 
estimate of each brand was carried out on the parameters that characterize the brand recognition, business image of 
the company, value for money, and degree of favorable attitude toward the company (tour operator) from the target 
audience. The brand reputation of each tour operator was calculated as the sum of the answers to the four relevant 
questions divided by the number of experts surveyed.  Thus, the final evaluation can be in the range from 4 (all 
experts gave the lowest possible score on all four parameters brand) to 40 (all experts gave the highest possible 10 
points in all respects). 
Tour Operator Size. In order to measure this variable we used an indicator of the number of tours sold in one year. 
The study used data from 2012. This indicator was selected to measure the size of tour operators because of the fact 
that in this particular case it adequately reflects the scale of the companies involved in the tour operator’s business. 
In addition, it is the one of the few indicators that are relevant to the measurement of the size of firms with the 
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accessible data in Russia. The selection of any other indicator to reflect the size of the number of firms used by other 
authors, for example, the value of assets (Ehrmann & Spranger, 2004), total sales in monetary terms (Kosova et al, 
2008; Botti and others, 2009) would be highly problematic in Russian conditions. 
Geographical Concentration. This figure indicates how the tour operator itself limits the territorial boundaries in 
dealing with travel agents. The meaning of this parameter is an inverse indicator of the geographical dispersion of 
enterprise networks from the central company, which can be defined in different ways. It is proposed by a number of 
authors that in relation to the U.S. retail trade networks there are two parameters that reflect the geographical 
dispersion of the network. This is the number of states and the number of countries covered by the activity 
(Lafontaine, 1992). Perrigot R. (2009) consider geographical range of restaurant chains in France in the context of 
the analysis of the franchising and ownership ratio through the rate of internationalization of business, the latter 
being defined as the percentage of participants in the network, which are located outside the domestic market.  
The index of geographical concentration (IGC) proposed in this article is related to the description of the tour 
operator’s agent network: 
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Thus, it is the sum of squares of shares of tour operator’s sales by regions. The smaller the number of regions served 
by the tour operator, the higher the level of geographical concentration of its business: 
If the tour operator operates in one region, the A1 = 100%, hence IGC = 10000. 
In case of two regions, the share of each region is equal to 50%, IGC = 502 + 502 = 5000. 
If the number of regions is 10 and they have equal shares, then IGC = 1012 + ... + 10102 = 1000. 
If the number of tour operator’s customers is distributed unevenly and the number of sold tours of the company 
comes mostly from just one of the regions, the index IGC will be high. Using the theoretical assumption of a 
uniform distribution of business in all existing official Russian regions, the total amount of which in a March 1, 
2008 was 83, the value of IGC will be minimal. Thus, the index of geographical concentration of business of tour 
operators in the Russian Federation will be in the range of 120.48 (Lack of concentration) to 10000 (the 
concentration of activities in one region). 
The sample consisted of 83 Russian tour operators working in the market of international outbound tourism. Most of 
the data was obtained from the open reports, archival data and sites of the Russian Union of Travel Industry 
(www.rostourunion.ru), the Association of Tour Operators of Russia (www.atorus.ru), the Russian Franchise 
Association (www.rarf.ru), as well as the official websites of tour operators. The measurement of the tour operators’ 
brand reputation was based on assessments of leading experts in the field of tourism industry of Russia. 
 
Results 
 
The coefficient of determination of the resulting regression equation within the three-factor regression model (R2) 
was found to be 0.92, which indicates the high quality of the model. Variables “Brand name” and “Geographical 
concentration" were statistically significant, respectively, with p<0.05 and p<0.1. In this case, the variable “Tour 
Operator Size” turned out to be statistically non-significant at p = 0.76. Thus, hypothesis 2 is not confirmed. 
Given that one of the selected variables was not statistically significant, a new multiple regression model was built 
and tested to identify the degree of influence of the other two factors on the propensity of tour operators to partner 
without statistically insignificant factor of the firm size. 
The resulting model has maintained a high level of quality in R2 = 0.92. Variables "Top brand" and “Geographical 
Concentration” were statistically significant respectively at p <0.05 and p<0.1. The values of the coefficients of the 
independent variables “Brand name” and “Geographical concentration" indicate the positive influence of relevant 
factors on the commitment of tour operators to the partnership scheme of cooperation with travel agencies (Table 1 
and Table 2). However, we should pay attention to the much lower value of the coefficient of the second 
independent variable, that is an evidence of the relatively weak relationship (albeit positive) of the factor of 
geographical concentration of the agent chain and tour operators’ propensity to partner with travel agencies. 
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Table 1. The influence of brand reputation and geographical concentration on the propensity of tour operators to 
partner with travel agencies  
  Coefficients Standard Error t-stat P-value 
Y-intercept 2.975441132 0.583665158 5.097856346 2.25195E-06 
Brand name  1.382860168 0.493840655 2.80021532 0.00639999 
Geographical 
concentration 0.000872351 0.00040263 2.166630696 0.033238797 
 
Multiple R 0.95976576    
R square  0.921150315    
Adjusted R square 0.919179073    
Standard error 1.71787626    
Observations 83    
 
Table 2. ANOVA. 
df SS MS F Significance F 
Regression 2 2758.063652 1379.031826 467.2943533 7.44729E-45 
Residual 80 236.0879075 2.951098844 
Total 82 2994.15156       
        
 
Discussion 
 
As a result of the analysis the two hypotheses of three were confirmed, albeit with varying degrees of reliability. 
The closest positive correlation of tour operators’ propensity for partnership with travel agencies was found to be 
relative to the tour operator’s brand reputation. This is in principle, consistent with the results of other authors carried 
out previously on the example of various industries and countries (for example, Combs and Ketchen (1996). In the 
available studies on the influence of the brand development of inter-firm partnerships it is usually explained by a 
factor of the brand attractiveness of the central company to potential partners that looks quite convincing. But the 
confirmation of the proposed hypothesis may be also related to the specific characteristics of tourism as a sector of 
activity and the specificity of branding in Russia. 
It was already noted that the partnership between the Russian tour operators and travel agencies is developing mainly 
in forms when the tour operator is supposed to provide the right to use its brand to partnership travel agencies 
(through the licensing and commercial concession). In this kind of relationship the main threat to the brand owner is a 
danger of brand destruction or disposal. This potential risk may become real when, the core competencies that provide 
brand value are given to the partner company together with the right to use the brand. If there is only a partial transfer 
of core competencies of the company under the franchise agreement, these risks are not so clear. 
Core competencies of tour operators in outbound tourism are concentrated in the business processes associated not 
with the sale of tours by travel agencies but with the provision of services to ensure the consumption of tourism 
products offered. This includes the process of accommodation, transportation of tourists, nutrition, excursions, etc. 
Thus, post-sale service includes a range of services for future travelers and it is a key factor in determining the 
competitiveness of the tour operator. If these services will be provided to clients by independent organizations 
operating under the tour operator’s brand, then there may be a fairly high probability of failure or withdrawal of the 
brand. 
In the case when a tour operator gives the right to use its brand to travel agencies on terms of commercial concession 
or license, the risk of destruction of the brand, and, moreover, its disposal is minimal. Even if a particular travel 
agency under the brand of a certain tour operator does not work in the best way, it will cause much less damage to the 
brand of the latter than the possible disruption of air travel, poor organization of accommodation and food or poor 
tourist excursions etc. A disposed brand is virtually eliminated due to the reason that the travel agency as a mediator 
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can only function in a conjunction with the tour operator.  Although there are cases both in the Russian and foreign 
practice where travel agencies, using the experience of working together with a certain tour operator, start tour 
operator activities by themselves, but such cases are concentrated in the sphere of the internal tourism. They are 
extremely rare in the international outbound travel industry. This is probably a one of the reasons why Russian tour 
operators are inclined to sign contracts of franchise or license with travel agencies indiscriminately, that is, without 
sufficient test of capabilities of potential partners. This means that almost every entrepreneur who wishes to conclude 
partnership agreement (franchise or licensing) with any tour operator, including a company with a high brand 
reputation can achieve this purpose quite easily. And this may partly explain the reason why the tour operators with 
high brand value have greater percentage of partner travel agencies, than those tour operators with relatively low 
brand reputation. 
It probably shows the common trait to the whole Russian business community associated with some underestimation 
of the importance of branding. Russian trademark owners, including those that have a high market value, have 
relatively little concern for the risk of the brand destruction. This peculiarity is opposite to the practice prevailing in 
developed countries where brand owners are showing the utmost attention to preserving and increasing the value of 
their brand. And owner’s actions to protect the value of their brand usually cover not only the process of choosing a 
partner which is supposed to be granted the right to use the brand, but also the subsequent monitoring of its 
activities. The full extent of the above applies to franchise networks in tourism (Succurro, 2009). 
To be fair we should note that there is a tendency to overcome the entrenched relation to the branding in Russia, as 
evidenced by the numerous lawsuits over the brands and trademarks. But so far fairly significant differences from the 
Western practice still remain in this matter. 
The failure to confirm the hypothesis 2 does not necessarily mean the legitimacy of the opposite statement: the size of 
the company (the tour operator) and its propensity to partner with travel agencies are positively related. For example, 
the selection of a variable to measure the size of the firm and the characteristics of the sampling could serve as the 
reason for this result. At the same time a basic theoretical postulate of resource constraints, based on which it has been 
hypothesized, may have played an important role in this result. The assumption that the major central firms which 
have enough resources for market expansion would rather choose the option to create their own units and not a 
partnership with other companies in order to achieve this goal, apparently, is not justified. There are many examples 
that even well-off firms combine their own units with partners for many years within their own networks (Dant & 
Kaufmann, 2003). It means that the question of the relationship between own and affiliate units is hardly in close 
connection with the question of the relationship between partnership and market transactions. 
On the other hand, you cannot ignore the fact that the large size of travel agencies provides economies of scale, so that 
they can provide more favorable terms of cooperation for travel agents, rather than small companies. It certainly 
increases the attractiveness of the partnership offers of major tour operators. In addition, due to the large flow of 
tourists, a major tour operator is easier to compliment the tour. They have extensive cooperative ties with firms at 
destinations, which ensure the reliability and the high quality of their tourist services. Working in co-operation with 
the only major tour operator, travel agency can provide itself the sufficient turnover and profits and therefore it 
usually willingly agrees to form a partnership, even despite the rather stringent conditions limiting its independence 
offered by the tour operator. 
The results of testing the hypothesis 2 and the above considerations suggest the controversial nature of the relationship 
between the size of a tour operator and its propensity for partnerships. All of this indicates the need for further 
empirical studies of this relationship, perhaps with the use of other variables to measure the size of the company (the 
tour operator) and more accurate sampling. 
The results of hypothesis 3 generally confirm the theoretical assumption of representatives of the school of the 
organizational economy about factors that complicate the management of networks (certainly including the 
geographical dispersion of the network), due to higher transaction costs. The significance of this factor (geographical 
remoteness) is reduced due to the rapid development of information technologies and means of inter-firm 
communication. But as far as it can be judged by the test result of this hypothesis, the geographical dispersion of the 
agent network remains a significant factor restricting the development of strong partnerships between the tour 
operators and travel agencies. Partnership schemes are more suitable for firms that (being the central companies of the 
network) interact with market counterparts in certain geographic framework, in other words with a certain degree of 
geographical concentration of its agency network. 
The fact that the proposed hypothesis is confirmed yet with a relatively low rate of reliability, in our opinion, can be 
explained by the peculiarities of the Russian business in general and tourism in particular. This peculiarity is reflected 
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in the fact that still not all Russian tour operators are concerned about the handling and accurate management of agent 
network. Here we are dealing with the situation which is almost opposite to the one with branding in Russia, discussed 
above. 
Many of the tour operators working in the field of outbound tourism are focused on the current gain and rapid 
expansion to the local markets. They try to "tie" their local travel agencies (mainly through the opportunity to work 
under their brand), regardless of the geographical remoteness of potential partners. In an effort to consolidate its brand 
in the regions of the country as quickly as it possible, tour operators, the biggest part of which are located in Moscow 
and St. Petersburg, act similarly to the well-known principle of martial art, formulated by Napoleon Bonaparte: "The 
main thing is to get involved in the fight, and then we will see". However, though an emphasized circumstance fairly 
reduces the dependence of tour operators’ selection of partnership strategy on the index of geographical concentration 
of agent networks, but, in our opinion, it does not cancel this dependence. 
Other circumstances which are not directly related to the main theoretical promise (the influence of transaction costs 
on the choice of the partnership strategy) also contribute to the existence of a positive relationship between 
geographical concentration and tour operators’ propensity to form partnerships. The main attention should be paid to 
the fact that the Russian outbound tourism market is characterized by greater differentiation of demand for tours 
within different areas of the country because of the substantial regional differences in the population income, 
pronounced seasonal variation in the consumption of tourism products, extremely low population density in most of 
the country that becomes the reason for the corresponding geographical dispersion of demand for tours. In 
these circumstances, the "attachment" of the local travel agencies to a single tour operator (which is, as it was already 
mentioned, a one of the main conditions imposed by tour operators to partnership agreements) will hardly contribute 
to the success of the travel agency. Agencies working in small towns and rural areas in which a significant percentage 
of the population of Russia is located, are forced to sell tours of several or even many tour operators in order to 
survive. Only under this condition they can count on a more or less satisfactory demand for their mediation 
services. Therefore, if the top management of the company (the tour operator) will consistently adhere to the strategic 
line of the expansion of the firm to a growing number of regions (that will lead to a decrease in the index of 
geographical concentration of its agent network), the  indicators of the tour operators’ propensity to form partnerships 
with travel agencies will be reduced. That is the fact that, in our opinion, reflects, to a large extent, the results of 
verification of the hypothesis 3. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The study results clarify some of still little explored aspects of the development of inter-firm relations in the Russian 
outbound tourism. At the same time, they should be considered with some caution. Restrictions on the application of 
the study results are explained by the narrowness of the well-known analytical database. Further studies on the 
subjects are recommended basing on the expanded database including more determinants that influence the 
development of partnerships between key players of the tourist market. 
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